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tests of the Restatement to the specific facts of the case before them. However,
this procedure raises one interesting question. In Hyde the court was dealing
specifically with a breach of confidence in the appropriation of the trade secret.
Though the court in Hyde discusses the Restatement rule at length, the final
holding still relied only on the breach-of-confidence section. This point is ac-
centuated by the fact that since 1958 only one other Texas trade secret case has
specifically mentioned the Restatement rule, and in that case it was not the
basis of the holding because the trade secret issue was dismissed.' Because
DuPont was a case of first impression, however, the Fifth Circuit had to apply
what it thought to be the relevant Texas law."3 Hyde is the only case that men-
tions a cause of action for discovery by improper means. Since Hyde used sec-
tion 757 of the Restatement as the basis of its decision, the use of the Restate-
ment itself is not without precedent. It seems that it is upon this precedent that
the Fifth Circuit decided DuPont. In applying the rule to the facts of DuPont,
however, the court proceeded to adopt an even broader test for "improper"
than that used in the Restatement." With this decision the court took a large
step toward establishing higher standards of commercial morality in the busi-
ness world by opening the door to civil liability for commercial espionage. It
is hoped that the Texas courts will follow this precedent.
Bruce A. Cheatham
Freeing State Courts To Disregard Lower
Federal Court Constitutional Holdings
Richard Lawrence was convicted in state court of violating a city ordinance
against interfering with the duties of a police officer.' The conviction was
appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. Before that court ruled on the
appeal, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in an unrelated
action, declared the ordinance unconstitutional and void on its face.' Thereafter
the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed Lawrence's conviction without mention-
ing the federal court's invalidation of the ordinance.' Lawrence then attempted
an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court dismissed the
42 Furr's, Inc. v. United Specialty Advertising Co., 385 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso), error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1964).
' Judge Goldberg put the Erie question very stylistically: "This is a case of first im-
pression, for the Texas courts have not faced this precise factual issue, and sitting as a
diversity court we must sensitize our Erie antennae to divine what the Texas courts would
do if such a situation were presented to them." 431 F.2d at 1014.
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment t at 10 (1939); see notes 21, 41 supra,
and accompanying texts.
'CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 11, § 33 (1966). The ordinance was a broad prohibi-
tion against resisting or interfering with a police officer or "offering or endeavoring to do
so." This ordinance was repealed by the city of Chicago on March 26, 1968. Landry v.
Daley, 410 F.2d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 1969).
'Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The appeal of this decision by
the city of Chicago was dismissed because of mootness since the ordinance had been re-
pealed. Landry v. Daley, 410 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1969).
8City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill. 2d 461, 248 N.E.2d 71 (1969).
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appeal by treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for a writ of
certiorari and then denying it.' During his confinement Lawrence applied for
a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The writ was denied, and an
appeal was taken to the court of appeals. Held, affirmed: State courts are
not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts on federal constitutional
questions.' United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir.
1970), cert denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. May 18, 1971).
I. THE HISTORICAL DICHOTOMY
The constitutional power given Congress to establish a lower federal
judiciary' was quickly exercised through the Judiciary Act of 1789,' which
created a dual court system that has been the source of much friction. A fea-
ture of the dual court system as it has developed is that both state courts and
lower federal courts at times must rule on federal constitutional questions.!
The early reservations about the creation of a lower federal judiciary,' an
aspect of the general distrust of the new central government, were later
expressed in state assertions of the powers of nullification and interposition."
Although this states' rights attitude has endured,11 it has not prevented the
federal judiciary from being firmly established as a legitimate and authorita-
tive arm of the federal government. Federal jurisdiction and decision-making
power have been extended and delineated."2
In the determination of federal rights under the Constitution it is no longer
disputed that under the supremacy clause" the Supreme Court's decisions are
binding on all lower courts, both state and federal." What has never been
'Lawrence v. City of Chicago, 396 U.S. 39 (1969).
sAs the court pointed out, in a particular dispute in which a lower federal court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its adjudication is the law of the case
and thus binding. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir.
1970); see Falgout v. People, 459 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1969). Another issue resolved by the
court, but not discussed in this Note, was the question of the mootness of the application
for a writ of habeas corpus. Lawrence had been released, but the court held that the appeal
was not moot because there were "potential disabilities or burdens" which might have re-
sulted from the conviction being on his record. Id. at 1074-75.
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.7 Act of Sept. 1789, ch. 20, 5 11, 1 Stat. 73.
'See United States v. Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 463 (1936). As this relates to the
problems of uniformity of laws, see Comment, The State Courts and the Federal Common
Law, 27 ALBANY L. REv. 73 (1963).9 See 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25 (1911).
" These state efforts are analyzed in Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme
Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act,
47 AM. L. REv. 1 (1913), and Note, Interposition vs. Judicial Power-A Study of Ultimate
Authority in Constitutional Questions, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 465 (1956).
" An excellent example of modern states' rights philosophy can be found in C. BLOCH,
STATES' RIGHTS-THE LAW OF THE LAND (1958).
12See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (political questions); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), and Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S.
249 (1933) (declaratory judgments); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593
(1926) (ancillary jurisdiction).
13 U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
"See, e.g., Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); South Carolina v. Bailey,
289 U.S. 412 (1933); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931).
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satisfactorily decided is the degree of authority with which lower federal
courts speak in this area. The Supreme Court has not directly decided the
matter,"5 and there has been no real weight of authority established by lower
court decisions.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
Two distinct general approaches seem to have been applied in regard to
this problem area. First, judicial and statutory means of avoiding friction
between federal and state courts have limited the incidence of cases presenting
the question. Secondly, the issue has been expressly confronted in a sparse
and inconsistent line of federal and state decisions.
Begging the Question. Perhaps the explanation for the paucity of authority
on the question of the binding effect of lower federal court decisions is that
traditionally direct conflicts have been avoided by the use of judicial absten-
tion. The question of the duty of a state court to follow a lower federal court
decision will not arise when the federal court abstains from the case, even
though it has jurisdiction. A leading example of such forbearance is Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co.," in which a state action was being challenged
in federal court on constitutional grounds, but there were questions of state
law which might have made unnecessary any determination of constitution-
ality. The Court ordered the trial court to abstain, but to retain jurisdiction
until the state court ruled on the state matters. Clearly such abstention
would not be appropriate in a case in which the state statute would be un-
constitutional no matter how the state court interpreted it," nor when the
matters of state law are clear.'" Another possibly important exception to
abstention is in cases in which "statutes are justifiably attacked on their face
as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging
protected activities."".. The abstention doctrine is not statutory;" it is rather
Of course the Supreme Court is physically unable to answer all constitutional issues
raised. Regarding the extent to which time limits Supreme Court review, see The Supreme
Court. 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REV. 107 (1951). See also Stern, Denial of Certiorari
Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1953).
" The Supreme Court has on several occasions spoken in language which might indicate
the direction it would take were it directly confronted with the question presented in Law-
rence. "The decisions of the courts of the United States within their sphere of action, are
as conclusive as the laws of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution." Mayor v.
Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 253 (1867). In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), the Court
referred to "the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution . . . (which) has ever since been respected by this Court and
the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Again,
in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964), the
Court spoke of "the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law."
1312 U.S. 496 (1941).
"Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
"City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
"Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965). Admittedly it will take further
decisions by the Court to make clear the extent and applicability of the Dombrowski doc-
trine. There are indications that the Court may narrowly construe Dombrowski. In several
recent cases the Court has tersely denied relief under the doctrine. See, e.g., Zwicker v. Boll,
391 U.S. 353 (1968); Brooks v. Briley, 391 U.S. 361 (1968). Most often relief has been
denied by using the rationale that an adequate showing of potential irreparable injury has
not been made. See, e.g., Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971): Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).0 It has been suggested that abstention should generally be made discretionary, but
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a developing judicial policy, a "judge-fashioned vehicle for according ap-
propriate deference to the respective competence of the state and federal
court systems."'"
There have been several attempts by Congress to limit the area of state-
federal judicial friction. Since 1793 the enjoining of state proceedings by
federal courts has been restricted.22 The applicability of these statutes has not
been free from ambiguity."
The three-judge court acts provide for a special court of three judges, with
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, when an injunction is sought against the
enforcement of state statutes by state officers.' Three judges are required
only when injunctive relief is sought; therefore, a single federal judge can
declare a statute unconstitutional when it is challenged but restraint against its
enforcement is not sought."
While the doctrine of abstention and the statutes mentioned have limited
and defined the areas in which lower federal courts may act to obstruct state
enforcement of challenged state laws, they have only avoided the question of
the duty of a state court to follow a lower federal court's constitutional
holding.
Facing the Problem Squarely. The question does not seem to have been
considered extensively in the federal courts; however, the Fourth Circuit has
held that "state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the
Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state . . . [but] they are not
obliged to do so."'" Prior to Lawrence this decision stood alone in the federal
courts.
The state courts have not failed to consider the question, but they have
failed to establish any clear weight of authority. 7 Most of the decisions are
terse and conclusory. For instance, the Oklahoma court of criminal appeals
has declared it to be "axiomatic that in a case involving an interpretation of
federal statutes . . . state courts of last resort are bound by all pertinent
applicable federal statutes and decisions .... 2" Some state courts have based
their decisions on policy rationale. The Supreme Court of Califorriia has
stated:
Any rule which would require the state courts to follow in all cases the de-
cisions of one or more lower federal courts would be undesirable, as it would
have the effect of binding the state courts where neither the reasoning nor
the number of federal cases is found persuasive. Such a rule would not sig-
that abstention of the type stated in the Pullman case should be made statutory. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1371(c) (Official Draft 1969).
2' England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
22 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, S 5, 1 Stat. 334. The present anti-injunction statute is
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
"a See Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 471, 482 (1965).
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309,
17, 36 Stat. 557).
25 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
21 Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cit. 1965).
"
7 The state authority is analyzed in Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943).2 Ellis v. State, 386 P.2d 326, 328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
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nificantly promote uniformity in federal law, for the interpretation of an
Act of Congress by a lower federal court does not bind other federal courts
except those directly subordinate to it. 9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reasoned that
forum shopping would result were a state court not bound to follow a clear
prior federal court holding."0 The court held that, lacking a Supreme Court
decision in point, the Third Circuit is the "ultimate arbiter in Pennsylvania"
on federal questions."' The Supreme Court of Michigan has "adhered to the
rule that a State court is bound by the authoritative holdings of Federal
courts upon Federal questions."'" The court added, however, that when "the
Federal circuit courts of appeals themselves are in disagreement upon the
proper interpretation of a Federal act," it feels free to select the interpretation
which seems most reasonable.8
An examination of the federal and state decisions reveals that there is a
deep split in the authorities and that the analyses used by the courts in deciding
the question have not been satisfactory.
III. UNITED STATES EX REL. LAWRENCE V. WOODS
The Seventh Circuit in Lawrence held that state courts are not bound by
constitutional holdings of lower federal courts. The court "found no federal
court decisions dealing directly with the point."' 4 Thus the 1965 Fourth Cir-
cuit opinion" and past Supreme Court dicta on the effect of the supremacy
clause 6 were ignored. The court instead briefly mentioned the split in the
"Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 51 Cal. 2d 759, 764, 336 P.2d 521, 524
(1959), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 628 (1960). See also People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.
3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969). One writer has agreed with the court:
The policy of uniformity which prompted the ruling in the Erie case does not
militate against the conclusion that lower federal court decisions need have no
more than persuasive effect in the state courts . . . . Whichever forum, state
or federal, is chosen, the same opportunity for ultimate resolution by the
Supreme Court is available. The uniformity thus assured prevents advantage
being taken of temporary disharmony between state and lower federal court
decisions.
Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 943, 947, 948 (1948).
"Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965). A contrary opinion
has been expressed:
Evidently the prevention of forum shopping is not a factor in the federal
rights situation. In FELA cases, in fact, Congress seems to have encouraged
forum shopping for plaintiffs by granting concurrent jurisdiction to state
courts. Actually, the federal-rights doctrine amounts to a sort of money-back
guarantee to such a forum shopper. If a plaintiff picks a state court but it
turns out that he made a mistake, he can rely on federal procedure to help
bail him out.
Note, Procedural Protection for Federal Rights in State Courts, 30 U. CIN. L. REV. 184,
192 (1961).
"213 A.2d at 672.
"Schueler v. Weintrob, 360 Mich. 621, 105 N.W.2d 42, 48 (1960). One scholar would
seem to concur. "The supremacy clause, of course, makes plain that if a state court under-
takes to adjudicate a controversy it must do so in accordance with whatever federal law is
applicable." Hart, The Relations Between Federal and State Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
507 (1954).
33 105 N.W.2d at 48. See also Robertson Lumber Co. v. Progressive Contractors, Inc.,
160 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1968).
'4432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cit. 1970).
"See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
"See note 15 supra.
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state courts on the question, and then chose to adopt the view of the New
Jersey and Iowa state courts.87 The decision does not make clear the magni-
tude of the split on the matter in the state courts, nor does it detail the various
rationale used by the state courts in deciding the matter.
Deciding not to treat the issue in the context of the historical conflict be-
tween state and federal courts, the court thus omitted any reference to absten-
tion or to the statutory restrictions mentioned above.38 Nor was any policy
argument advanced. The reasoning used was simply that Supreme Court
rulings on federal questions are binding on state and federal courts, but that
since lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state courts,
the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts. Thus,
state courts may disregard prior lower federal court determinations of federal
questions, " and questioned state conduct such as that involved in Lawrence v.
Woods may continue until it is specifically enjoined or until the state statute
being enforced is held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a two-page portion of the Lawrence opinion the Seventh Circuit cursori-
ly disposed of an extremely important constitutional issue. The decision
seems to raise more questions than it answers. When a lower federal court
has declared a state statute unconstitutional, should not the decision be binding
on the state courts if the state does not appeal the decision? If the Supreme
Court denies certiorari, are the state courts free to disregard the lower federal
courts? What about the proposition that since a federal circuit court encom-
passes the entire state, its ruling should be binding on the state's courts? The
court did not discuss these questions. The attitude of the court seems to have
been that if a complainant chooses to have his federal rights determined in
a federal court, he must be able to persuade the court to grant an injunction
against the enforcement of the state statute (something federal judges are
naturally reluctant to do)"0 or else he must see that the case gets to the
Supreme Court (something which he has little control over)."
The failure of the Seventh Circuit to weigh any policy considerations in its
decision seems most unffortunate.2 Surely uniformity of federal law would
"
7 The court cited State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965), and Iowa Nat'l
Bank v. Stewart, 214 Iowa 1229, 232 N.W. 445 (1930).
" See notes 22 and 24 supra, and accompanying text.
" The court limited its holding to the facts of the case, that is, a situation where the
two actions are unrelated. See note 5 supra.
" See Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S.
45 (1941). See also 22 Sw. L.J. 537 (1968). A strong statement of the general reluctance
of federal judges to interfere with state proceedings was given by Mr. Justice Holmes. 5
THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE, TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORD 5516 (1929). Mr. Justice Car-
dozo delivered a statement similar in nature. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122
(1934).
41 See note 14 supra. Of course, if the complainant wins in the lower federal court, the
question of appeal is entirely in the hands of the state authority.
4 It should be noted, however, that the case seems to have been argued primarily on a
power basis: "An analysis based on power, which is the underlying issue, leads to the con-
clusion that a decision of a lower federal tribunal declaring federal law is, as are the de-
cisions of this Court, imbued with the strength of the Supremacy Clause." Petitioner's Brief
for Certiorari at 12, United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. May 18, 1971).
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